Transcranial Electrical Stimulation to Enhance Cognitive Performance of Healthy Minors: A Complex Governance Challenge by Jantien W. Schuijer et al.
fnhum-11-00142 March 23, 2017 Time: 15:30 # 1
REVIEW
published: 27 March 2017
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2017.00142
Edited by:
Roy H. Hamilton,
University of Pennsylvania, USA
Reviewed by:
Filippo Brighina,
University of Palermo, Italy
Adam C. Snyder,
University of Pittsburgh, USA
*Correspondence:
Jantien W. Schuijer
j.w.schuijer@vu.nl
Received: 15 September 2016
Accepted: 09 March 2017
Published: 27 March 2017
Citation:
Schuijer JW, de Jong IM, Kupper F
and van Atteveldt NM (2017)
Transcranial Electrical Stimulation
to Enhance Cognitive Performance
of Healthy Minors: A Complex
Governance Challenge.
Front. Hum. Neurosci. 11:142.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2017.00142
Transcranial Electrical Stimulation to
Enhance Cognitive Performance of
Healthy Minors: A Complex
Governance Challenge
Jantien W. Schuijer1*, Irja M. de Jong1, Frank Kupper1 and Nienke M. van Atteveldt2,3
1 Athena Institute, Faculty of Earth and Life Sciences, VU University, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 2 Department of Educational
Neuroscience, Faculty of Behavioral and Movement Sciences, VU University, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 3 Institute of Brain
and Behavior Amsterdam, VU University, Amsterdam, Netherlands
An increasing number of healthy adolescents are consuming products that can
enhance their cognitive performance in educational settings. Currently, the use of
pharmaceuticals is the most widely discussed enhancement method in the literature, but
new evidence suggests that other methods based on Transcranial Electrical Stimulation
(tES) also have potential as cognitive enhancer. Just like pharmaceutical enhancers,
the availability and education-related use of tES-devices raise a broad range of ethical,
legal, and societal issues that need to be addressed by policy-makers. Few studies,
however, have specifically explored these issues in relation to child wellbeing. In this
narrative review with systematic search, we describe the issues for child wellbeing that
could arise from the availability and education-related use of tES-based enhancers by
healthy minors. We demonstrate that the issues form a complex web of uncertainties
and concerns, which are mainly incited by two factors. First is the high level of factual
uncertainty due to gaps in empirical evidence about the exact working mechanisms
and efficacy of tES. Moreover, a lack of insight into the technique’s (long-term) effects
on healthy developing brains, and uncertainties about potential cognitive trade-offs
have fueled concerns about the technique’s safety and impact. The second factor
that contributes to the complexity of issues is the presence of moral diversity in our
society. Different opinions exist on whether a certain enhancement effect would be
desirable and whether potential risks would be acceptable. These opinions depend
on one’s moral perspective, and the way one interprets and weights values such as
the child’s autonomy and authenticity. The challenge for proper governance resides in
the design of an appropriate framework that is capable of balancing the different moral
perspectives in society, while recognizing the uncertainties that still exist. We therefore
argue for a responsible innovation approach, which encourages an adaptive attitude
toward emerging knowledge and dynamic societal values, to deal with the identified
issues regarding tES-based enhancement appropriately.
Keywords: Transcranial Electrical Stimulation, cognitive enhancement, child wellbeing, complex problems,
governance, responsible innovation, ethics
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INTRODUCTION
In educational environments replete of academic performance
pressures and competition to secure future career opportunities,
students constantly search for ways to improve themselves
and to stand out of the crowd. It may therefore not be
surprising that the topic of cognitive enhancement has become
increasingly popular over the past few years. One of the most
widely discussed cognitive enhancers is the so-called “smart
pill.” Although developed for treating disorders, previous studies
have reported that a considerable number of healthy students
make use of pharmaceutical products, such as the ADHD
drugs methylphenidate (Ritalin, Concerta) and amphetamine
salts (Adderall) to enhance their cognitive abilities and improve
their educational performances. Reported prevalence rates of
these practices vary between studies, which could be related
to the differences in study samples, employed definitions, and
reporting styles (e.g., life-time prevalence versus past year
prevalence). Yet, the numbers do suggest that the consumption
of enhancing pharmaceuticals is not uncommon in educational
settings. Reported rates in the United States and Canada range
from 2.5% to as high as 55% (Smith and Farah, 2011). Although a
recent review of Maier and Schaub (2015) suggested that the non-
medical consumption of drugs to enhance cognitive performance
seems less common in Europe than in the United States,
its reported use is still substantial, with disclosed prevalence
rates between 2 and 16%. What is particularly striking is that
enhancing pharmaceuticals are not only illicitly consumed by
adult students in universities, but that some healthy minors in
school settings also seem to make use of these substances. For
example, a recent study in Switzerland showed that 9.2% of
the 16- to 19-year-old secondary school students included in
the sample (n = 1139) had illicitly used prescription drugs for
cognitive enhancement purposes at least once (Liakoni et al.,
2015). This suggests that we should not only pay attention
to cognitive enhancement practices in college and university
settings, but also focus on enhancement behaviors of children in
school.
Although most of the enhancers currently used in educational
settings are pharmaceuticals, new cognitive enhancement
methods based on non-invasive neurotechnologies have emerged
that may also find their way into schools. One of these methods is
Transcranial Electrical Stimulation (tES). Several recent studies
have shown that tES-based technologies, such as transcranial
direct current stimulation (tDCS) and transcranial random noise
stimulation (tRNS), are not only effective for the improvement
of disorder related impairments, but can also be used to induce
cognitive enhancement in healthy people (Cohen Kadosh et al.,
2010; Cappelletti et al., 2013; Martin et al., 2014; Zwissler
et al., 2014). The use of tES techniques has been linked to
improvements in several cognitive domains, including memory,
attention, language, mathematics and decision-making (Cohen
Kadosh, 2013). In some cases, enhancement effects have shown
to be long-lasting. A study performed by Cohen Kadosh et al.
(2010), in which tDCS was applied to the parietal lobes of
healthy adults during training sessions with artificial numerical
characters, showed that stimulation of these brain areas resulted
in long-lasting enhancement of numerical proficiency. Similarly,
a more recent tRNS study demonstrated that concurrent
stimulation of the parietal lobes during training of a numerosity
discrimination task could boost long-term task performance,
with discernable effects up to 16 weeks (Cappelletti et al., 2013).
In contrast to Cohen Kadosh et al. (2010), who found the
enhancement effects to be specific to learned material only,
Cappelletti et al. (2013) demonstrated that the enhancement
effects were also transferable to performance on other tasks that
measured similar underlying constructs. This would make the
technique even more attractive as a tool for enhancement of
cognitive functions.
The promising results of enhancement studies have made
tES-based neurotechnologies potentially interesting for use in
educational settings. However, some studies suggest that positive
stimulation effects of tES are not always guaranteed. Both Cohen
Kadosh et al. (2010) and Zwissler et al. (2014), for example,
showed that reversing the current stream of tES yielded opposite
effects on cognitive performance (i.e., an impairment instead
of improvement). Moreover, the outcomes of two extensive
systematic reviews by Horvath et al. (2015a,b) demonstrated that
we do not yet fully comprehend the working mechanisms of
tES-based enhancement, as no reliable evidence was found for
either cognitive or physiologic effects from tDCS. Further doubts
about the effects and working mechanism of tES were fueled by a
recent experiment of György Buzsáki and Antal Berényi1. These
two researchers applied tDCS to the skull of a human cadaver,
and found that almost none of the current actually entered the
brain. However, the results of that particular experiment have not
been peer-reviewed yet, and questions may be raised about the
generalizability of results from cadaver studies to living human
beings. Recently, several animal studies have been performed
to gain more insight into how tES modulates neural function
(Bennabi et al., 2014). Translational studies may help to shed light
on the exact working mechanisms of tES in the future.
Besides the discussion about the technology’s potential and
effectiveness, it is crucial to consider the ethical, legal, and societal
issues associated with the application of tES. Various authors
have expressed their concerns on these points (Bostrom and
Sandberg, 2009; Cohen Kadosh et al., 2012; Maslen et al., 2014b),
and this has triggered discussion on the desirability of tES-
based enhancing technologies. The pro- and counter arguments
provided in this discussion are part of a more extensive and
overarching debate on the use of neuroenhancers in general
(“the neuroenhancement debate”), including pharmaceutical
neuroenhancers. Although many arguments have been put
forward that either encourage or criticize the use and availability
of neuroenhancers, consensus on the topic has not been
reached yet, especially not in regards to the newer enhancing
neurotechnologies, such as tES. Moreover, despite the indications
that neuroenhancement might already be used before adolescents
enter higher education, few studies have specifically explored the
issues generated by tES in relation to the child.
1Underwood, E. “Cadaver study casts doubt on how zapping brain may
boost mood, relieve pain”, Science, April 20, 2016, accessed June 20, 2016,
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/04/cadaver-study-casts-doubts-how-
zapping-brain-may-boost-mood-relieve-pain
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This gap in the neuroenhancement literature calls for an
analysis of the arguments in the neuroenhancement debate that
are applicable to neurotechnologies. Particularly, in light of
incorporating a broad perspective on ethical, legal, and societal
issues, it would be appropriate to focus on the child’s wellbeing,
which is a concept that moves beyond measures that purely
relate to brain functioning and cognitive performance levels.
Therefore, a first aim of this article is to describe the issues
for child wellbeing that could arise from the availability and
education-related use of tES-based enhancers by healthy minors.
We will do this by using a child wellbeing framework to combine
insights from (1) ethical literature on tES-based enhancement,
and (2) ethical literature on pharmaceutical enhancement that
specifically adopts a child-centered perspective using a narrative
review approach with a systematic search (see Supplementary
Materials for search strategy).
Identifying child wellbeing issues is essential for our second
goal of exploring how to deal responsibly with the availability
and education-related use of tES technologies. This question
actually relates to a governance challenge, and is particularly
relevant to address considering the fact that tES-devices are
currently still unregulated, and are therefore relatively easy to
access (Maslen et al., 2014a). One only has to internet search
“tDCS device” to find out that existing uncertainties about the
effects of tES have not tempered the public’s curiosity for tES-
based enhancement. A large number of websites and online
forums exist that discuss how to build and apply tES-devices
at home, with some of these websites having over several
thousands of subscribers. In addition, various tES-devices have
been launched on the consumer market (e.g., Thync, Foc.us,
The Brain Stimulator, ApeX), all of which claim to improve
attention, performance or other cognitive functions. Since the
devices are portable and relatively inexpensive, with prices
ranging from approximately $49 to $299 (Wexler, 2015), they
might be particularly alluring to children and parents who would
like to boost educational performances. We believe that it is
important to specifically address the governance challenge of
tES in light of the issues for child wellbeing, since the child-
perspective adds a layer of complexity that governance measures
should be able to account for. Ethical issues can be regarded
as extra sensitive and morally problematic when linked to the
stake of children, and this stresses the need for a governance
approach that recognizes and deals responsibly with the high
complexity of issues associated with tES-based enhancement by
minors.
ENHANCEMENT AND THE CHILD
WELLBEING PERSPECTIVE
Before we start describing the issues for child wellbeing that
arise from the availability and education-related use of tES-
devices, we need to clarify the concept of child wellbeing and
point out its relevance for discussing the topic of cognitive
enhancement. We will first elaborate on this latter term,
since the word “enhancement” seems to be used in different
ways by different authors that contribute to the scientific
discussion on the use of neuroenhancers. In experimental
studies, the term ‘enhancement’ is often used as an equivalent
of improved performance on specific neuropsychological tests
(Schleim, 2014). In contrast, some researchers who study the
ethical aspects of neuroenhancement criticize the use of this
definition in the neuroenhancement debate, as it may evoke the
false assumption that improved test-performance or increased
cognitive functionality automatically leads to a better life (Earp
et al., 2014; Nagel, 2014; Schleim, 2014). Instead, they opt for a
broader and more general definition of enhancement proposed
by Savulescu et al. (2011) – also referred to as the welfarist
definition – which describes enhancement as: “any change in the
biology or psychology of a person which increases the chances of
leading a good life in a given set of circumstances” (p. 6). An
important aspect of this welfarist definition is that it defines
enhancement in the context of wellbeing (Savulescu et al., 2011).
So, it is not an increase in cognitive functioning that determines
whether or not one can speak of enhancement, but whether a
change in functioning – which could be either a diminishment
or an increase – actually results in heightened levels of overall
wellbeing (Earp et al., 2014).
The welfarist approach of enhancement provides a useful
starting point for this review, in particular because we focus
on the availability and education-related use of neuroenhancing
technologies in healthy children. Healthy children do not suffer
from mental or bodily impairments that they wish to improve
in order to reach normal levels of functioning. Instead, healthy
children would employ neuroenhancers to perform “better than
well” (Elliot, 2003 in Nagel, 2014). However, is performance
that is better than well also favorable for each individual child?
According to several authors, it requires a holistic approach to
answer this question; we need to move beyond the scope of
mental and bodily functioning by including aspects that are
related to an individual’s surrounding context (Nagel, 2014;
Schleim, 2014). The wellbeing perspective of the current study
allows us to apply such a holistic approach and to study the effect
of the availability and use of neuroenhancing technologies within
various life domains of the child.
In literature on the concept of wellbeing, it is widely
recognized that children should be treated as a distinct group with
their own set of needs and wishes to establish wellbeing (Fattore
et al., 2006; Ben-Arieh, 2000). This seems fair, as children differ
from adults in several ways, including the level of dependence
on family or caregivers and the stage of important mental
and physical development. Although many articles have been
published that specifically target child wellbeing, no consensus
has been reached yet on the precise definition of the concept.
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) refers to child wellbeing as a measure for “the quality
of children’s lives” (Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development [OECD], 2009, p. 24), but acknowledges the
lack of a comprehensive framework for the assessment of such
quality. Current studies often recognize that the concept child
wellbeing consists of multiple dimensions such as mental, social,
and physical ones, but a unified view on the number and types
of dimensions that should be included has not emerged as yet
(Pollard and Lee, 2003; Organization for Economic Co-operation
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FIGURE 1 | A framework of child wellbeing, adapted from Moore and Theokas (2008) and Lee (2014). The components of each of the child wellbeing
domains are explained in the four squares, and the circle around the squares represents the societal context that directly or indirectly influences the domains.
and Development [OECD], 2009; Ben-Arieh and Frones, 2011;
Lee, 2014).
Despite the lack of a universally acclaimed definition
and approach to measure child wellbeing, some salient and
overarching dimensions of the concept can be recognized when
analyzing the various frameworks that have been used in the past.
Both Moore and Theokas (2008) and Lee (2014) performed such
an analysis and discriminated four main outcome domains of
child wellbeing: physical, psychological, cognitive wellbeing, and
social wellbeing (see Figure 1). In addition, they elaborate on
the relevance of studying contextual factors that could indirectly
influence the outcome domains of child wellbeing. Moore and
Theokas (2008), for example, refer to contexts such as family,
peers, school, and neighborhood. Here, we chose to use the
term “societal context” to encapsulate all social structures and
dynamics in the child’s environment that could impact the level
of child wellbeing either positively and negatively. In Figure 1,
we have depicted the societal context as a circle around the four
child wellbeing domains to emphasize its diffuse influence on
all these domains. Although both Moore and Theokas (2008)
and Lee (2014) stress that their child wellbeing framework is
not meant to be all-inclusive, the authors do emphasize its
functionality as a basic structure to shape discussion about
desired child wellbeing outcomes. In the current article, we use
the four child wellbeing outcome domains and the umbrella
domain of socio-contextual influences to describe the issues
of tES-based cognitive enhancement from a child wellbeing
perspective.
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FIGURE 2 | Overview of the identified issues for child wellbeing that arise from the availability and education-related use of tES-based enhancers.
tES-BASED ENHANCEMENT:
IDENTIFYING THE ISSUES FOR CHILD
WELLBEING
Our review showed that the availability and education-related
use of tES-based enhancers is associated with a wide range of
issues that could directly or indirectly influence child wellbeing.
Figure 2 depicts the issues for child wellbeing that we identified in
the literature, based on the main structure of our child wellbeing
framework (see Figure 1). Although in this section, we link most
issues to a particular child wellbeing domain, one must remember
that child wellbeing is a holistic concept and that some issues
might therefore actually span multiple domains or have close
connections with issues in other child wellbeing domains. In
addition, we would like to note that we did not identify any issues
that directly relate to our definition of social wellbeing of the
child, which is targeted at the individual level (see Figure 1).
One possible explanation relates to our focus on enhancement
practices that aim to improve cognitive functioning and school
performances, instead of enhancement methods that are directly
targeted at improving an individual’s social skills and social
functioning. Evidently, we do not claim that tES is unable to
directly affect social skills or an individual’s ability to function in
social structures, but this particular enhancement effect was not
frequently discussed in the selected literature (see Supplementary
Materials). We did identify several issues that relate to the
societal context in which children reside (i.e., depicted as the
circle in Figure 1), and although these issues are not directly
affecting the social functioning of an individual child, they do
apply to social structures and dynamics (e.g., relationships, social
ordering, interaction patterns) in the environment of the child
that could indirectly impact each of the child wellbeing domains.
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The subsequent paragraphs will describe each of the issues that
we identified in the literature.
Issues for Physical Child Wellbeing
Safety and Long-Term Effects on the Child’s Brain
Safety of enhancement methods is a frequently addressed concern
in the literature, and is an issue that could pose a serious threat
to the child’s physical wellbeing. Authors expressed an optimistic
view regarding the acute safety profile of tES techniques with
acute side-effects that seemed rather mild (e.g., headaches, skin
irritations). Yet, most of them also emphasized that caution
should be warranted with regard to the long-term effects of tES-
based brain stimulation, as little is yet known about such potential
effects (Chatterjee, 2013; Dresler et al., 2013; Hildt, 2014; Lapenta
et al., 2014; Maslen et al., 2014b).
In addition, special reference should be made to the current
lack of translational studies in healthy children. Authors stress
that established knowledge on potential side-effects and efficacy
is derived from studies that have used adult participants, but
that the developing brains of children might react differently to
either pharmaceutical enhancing substances or tES technologies
(Singh and Kelleher, 2010; Cohen Kadosh et al., 2012; Flanigan,
2013; Graf et al., 2013; Levy and Savulescu, 2014; Maslen et al.,
2014b). Cohen Kadosh et al. (2012) specifically refer to tES-based
neurotechnologies and explain that the localization of the correct
stimulation sites might be problematic, since the child’s brain
continuously develops and the location of stimulation sites might
therefore change. Since guidelines for the use of tES technolgies in
children are still lacking (Levy and Savulescu, 2014), the use of tES
on children might result in unexpected side effects that could be
detrimental for the child’s health. Flanigan (2013) further stresses
that evidence on safety and side-effects of neuroenhancement in
children will probably not become available any time soon, as
the enrollment of healthy children in clinical trials is generally
considered to be unethical. Although we could imagine that
children with diagnosed cognitive impairments could be allowed
to participate in future clinical trials, this still would not bring
any certainty for the safety of tES-based technologies in healthy
children. An atypical brain might react differently to stimulation
than a typical brain (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2012), and the
usage-frequency might be different for enhancement compared
to treatment, which could result in disparate effects on the
brain (Singh and Kelleher, 2010). Therefore, the current lack
of translational studies on tES-based enhancement in healthy
children augments the concerns about usage-safety.
The Danger of Do-It-Yourself (DIY) Practices
Another issue for physical safety of the child, particularly relevant
in the case of tES, relates to the risks associated with do-it-
yourself (DIY) practices of enhancement, either in the form
of home-building practices of tES devices or the home-use
of premanufactured tES-technologies by lay people. Fitz and
Reiner (2014) explain that an “easily accessable world of DIY
tDCS enhancement” has arisen due to the inexpensiveness of the
technique and the easily accessible ingredients that are needed
to build a tDCS device at home (p. 74). Consequently, lay
people are enabled to use these stimulation devices without
sufficient background knowledge on brain functionality or safe
usage guidelines (Levy and Savulescu, 2014). Fitz and Reiner
(2014) reason that the self-created tDCS devices allow individuals
to manipulate a broad set of parameters, including polarity,
current density, stimulation duration, and frequency of use.
Moreover both Cohen Kadosh et al. (2012) and Fitz and Reiner
(2014) express their concerns about electrode placement of
premanufactured or home-built tDCS-devices, and the possible
use of tDCS on cortical areas for which tDCS was not
investigated. Since the safety of tES-based technologies has only
been tested in clinical settings and effects of home-use, with
potentially more extreme parameter settings, are still unknown
(Fitz and Reiner, 2014; Hildt, 2014), the use of DIY tDCS by
parents or minors at home or in school might put the child’s
physical well-being at risk.
Deception and Safety
The use of deceptive terms and messages about cognitive
enhancers was also considered an issue by some authors,
as it might result in parents and children underestimating
the possible safety risks of certain enhancement techniques.
Concerns were expressed about both concealed and direct-to-
consumer advertisement, and the unrealistic expectations of
enhancement efficacy they may raise in parents and teachers
(Singh and Kelleher, 2010; Flanigan, 2013). In addition, Cohen
Kadosh et al. (2012) mention that people have the tendency to
consider the use of external enhancers, which do not physically
enter the body, to be less questionable than the use of internal
enhancers that are taken up by the body, such as pharmaceuticals.
As a consequence, people might unjustly assume that the use of
tDCS is quite safe, considering its external mode of application
(Cohen Kadosh et al., 2012). Lastly, both Fitz and Reiner (2014)
and Hildt (2014) refer to the deceptive nature of the term “non-
invasive stimulation,” which is often used to describe the practice
of tDCS and other tES-technologies. This term is derived from
the surgical literature, in which it is often used to differentiate
tES-techniques from practices such as deep-brain-stimulation
that require surgery (Fitz and Reiner, 2014). However, the term
“non-invasive” might evoke a false sense of security, which could
result in the underestimation of the safety risks involved in tES-
based enhancement, and could therefore pose a threat to the
wellbeing of children.
Issues for Cognitive Child Wellbeing
Efficacy
Although tES is associated with a range of promising cognitive
benefits, which could potentially boost children’s educational
performances, many authors also refer to the current level of
uncertainty when it comes to these cognitive results. Dresler
et al. (2013), for example, explain that the efficacy of tDCS is
highly dependent on the identification of the correct stimulation
site, and that the most effective tDCS-enhancement studies have
employed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to
guide the localization of stimulation sites. The fMRI-tool will
not likely be part of the tDCS-set that individuals can use at
home or in schools, and the enhancement effects of tDCS devices
employed by inexperienced home-users might therefore be less
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pronounced. Similarly, reversing the polarity of a tDCS device
could generate opposite effects on cognitive performance and
thus decrease the intended effects of stimulation, as can be
concluded from studies that Fitz and Reiner (2014) mention in
their ethical analysis. Furthermore, Levy and Savulescu (2014)
refer to studies that show the individual variability of tES-efficacy,
with enhancement effects being more pronounced in subjects
with low base-line performance compared to individuals with
high base-line performance. However, it should be noted that
alternative explanations might be possible for these individual
differences, such as ceiling effects or regression to the mean.
Overall, it seems that no certainty exists yet with regard to the
benefits of tES-based enhancement for cognitive wellbeing, and
incorrect application settings could even result in impairment of
cognitive function. Cohen Kadosh et al. (2012) stress that this
empirical uncertainty about potential positive or negative effects
on cognitive functioning is even greater when it comes to tES-
based enhancement of healthy children, as no scientific studies
have yet been performed on this specific sub-population.
Cognitive Trade-offs
An issue that seems even more problematic for the cognitive
wellbeing of the child than questions regarding the efficacy
of tES-based enhancers is the concern for cognitive trade-offs.
A cognitive trade-off refers to a functional increase within one
cognitive domain that goes at the expense of a functional decrease
within another cognitive domain. A hypothetical example would
be an increase in numerical proficiency that goes at the expense
of verbal word recognition. In their ethical article on non-
invasive brain stimulation, Hamilton et al. (2011) suggest that the
mechanisms of tDCS might be more prone to induce cognitive
trade-offs than the intake of enhancing pharmaceuticals. They
explain that the stimulated brain region could be responsible for
more cognitive functions than the targeted one, which increases
the chance of additional and unforeseen effects. Alternatively,
they suggest that the stimulation of one brain area might
result in the subsequent inhibition or excitation of other brain
regions to which the stimulated area is functionally connected.
The cognitive functions that are regulated by these indirectly
manipulated brain regions could therefore become affected as
well.
Although most authors of ethical literature who report on the
issue of cognitive trade-offs explicitly refer to one or two clinical
studies in which a trade-off effect was found (Hamilton et al.,
2011; Cohen Kadosh et al., 2012; Hildt, 2014; Levy and Savulescu,
2014; Maslen et al., 2014b), Fitz and Reiner (2014) claim that
these recorded trade-offs could just be the tip of the iceberg.
They explain that most study protocols solely include measures
for cognitive functions that were the main target of their
enhancement procedures, and that unexpected effects on other
cognitive domains could therefore have remained unnoticed. In
order to see whether this could be the case, they performed a
meta-analysis on 112 tDCS studies, of which the results were
reported in their book chapter on ethical aspects of tDCS-based
enhancement. When they grouped all cognitive effects that were
found across studies with a similar mode of tDCS application,
e.g., with the cathode (i.e., positive electrode) placed over the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, their results showed that the same
stimulation paradigm could indeed result in different effects.
Stimulation with the cathode over the left dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, for example, caused impairment in declarative memory
in one study, while it resulted in improvement of pleasant
image recall in another. This supports the idea that tDCS-based
enhancement might result in more cognitive trade-offs than we
are currently aware of.
Some authors specifically refer to the issue of cognitive trade-
offs with regard to tDCS application to children (Cohen Kadosh
et al., 2012; Levy and Savulescu, 2014; Maslen et al., 2014b).
They stress that stimulation of certain brain areas could disturb
the typical development of a child’s brain, which might result
in permanent trade-offs. If cognitive trade-offs appear to be
common to neuroenhancement, doom scenarios as described
by Maslen et al. (2014b), in which parents and children choose
for enhancement, but inherently choose for impairment as well,
might become reality. This could negatively impact the present-
day cognitive wellbeing of children, but also their future cognitive
wellbeing if the effects prove to be permanent.
Issues for Psychological Child Wellbeing
Authenticity
A common issue discussed by ethicists in the field of
neuroenhancement relates to the impact that cognitive
enhancers, including tES technologies, have on human
authenticity. This concept is described as “an ethical ideal
that allows the true development of unique individuality and
self-fulfillment throughout life” (Graf et al., 2013, p. 1257), which
seems highly applicable to the psychological wellbeing of the
child. Opinions with regard to this issue seem to divert, but
although both pro- and counter arguments are put forward in
the literature, not many authors actually take a specific stance.
Concerns about the potential harm that both pharmaceutical
and tES-based enhancers could do to the authenticity of an
individual user were related to the possible destruction of
personality aspects that constitute to the true identity of a person.
People tend to see only some human characteristics as relevant
contributors to one’s personality and true identity. For instance,
many might not consider a pure enhancement of memory-
related skills or concentration as a change in personality, but do
consider their indirect effects on virtues, such as honesty and
fairness, as problematic for the preservation of one’s personal
identity (Hamilton et al., 2011). Therefore, it is difficult to set
clear boundaries as to what aspects of human being are morally
acceptable to enhance, and what aspects are not (Hamilton et al.,
2011). It could indeed be regarded problematic if the use of
cognitive enhancers jeopardizes some of the most fundamental
characteristics that distinguish us as human beings (Chatterjee,
2013), or if cognitive enhancement practices result in societal
disregard for human gifts, talents, and achievements, and thus
create a disregard for the true self (Hamilton et al., 2011). Issues
of harmed authenticity carry even more weight when we consider
the use of cognitive enhancers by children. Children are still
developing and exploring their identity and they should have
the opportunity to discover their own authentic self (Singh and
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Kelleher, 2010; Gaucher et al., 2013; Graf et al., 2013; Nagel and
Graf, 2013). By allowing children to use cognitive enhancers, be it
pharmaceuticals or tES-based devices, they could be deprived of
the chance to create their own true identity and to develop their
natural gifts and talents for their future lives (Singh and Kelleher,
2010; Gaucher et al., 2013). Therefore, not only the preservation
of present authenticity was identified as a concern, but also the
protection of future authenticity of the child (Nagel and Graf,
2013).
Besides the elaboration on the potential demolition of a child’s
authentic self, arguments were identified that could mitigate the
authenticity concerns. Some authors, for example, nuanced that
for some individuals cognitive enhancement could be a tool
to create a more authentic, instead of less authentic, version
of the self (Flanigan, 2013; Graf et al., 2013; Nagel and Graf,
2013). Singh and Kelleher (2010), for instance, refer to a study,
which shows that the use of stimulant medication by children
diagnosed with ADHD has a positive influence on their perceived
authenticity and experienced levels of agency, and Chatterjee
(2013) uses the case of sex change operations to exemplify that
changing an essential human characteristic could also promote
the expression of the true and authentic self. Furthermore, some
scholars stressed that the use of tES-technology will not lead to
sudden acquisition of skills that one did not have before, which
could unsettle your personal sense of identity (Cohen Kadosh
et al., 2012; Levy and Savulescu, 2014). Instead they emphasize
that the learning process still requires effort (Cohen Kadosh
et al., 2012; Levy and Savulescu, 2014), and is thus comparable
to other forms of educational guidance and teaching that are
not considered harmful to a person’s authenticity (Levy and
Savulescu, 2014). Their argument thus seems to appeal to a
different enhancement scenario, in which tES-based technologies
cannot create new talents or abilities, but can solely improve the
natural capabilities of a person, which are already part of their
authentic self.
Not all authors that tried to temper authenticity concerns did
so by counterclaiming the potential harmful effects of cognitive
enhancers for authenticity. Flanigan (2013) suggests that some
people might not regard authenticity as important value, and thus
do not concern themselves about this issue. She elaborates that
even if someone would hold authenticity as a personal value, this
value could still be overruled by other values, such as the desire
to fit in. Her argument therefore seems to claim that the choice
to protect one’s own authenticity should be a personal one, not a
collective one.
Cheating and Building Character
A concern that is closely related to the authenticity issue
is cheating. It revolves around the question whether one’s
capabilities are still true to one’s authentic self after the use of
a cognitive enhancer, and if its fair to work and study with
enhanced capabilities. According to Chatterjee (2013), the extent
to which the use of cognitive enhancers could be considered
as a form of cheating depends on the relative weight that is
put to end versus means of a certain task. If the outcome
is considered more important than the preceding actions to
achieve this outcome, then the use of an enhancer might not be
regarded as a problem. However, if the learning processes were
more important, taking the enhancer shortcut would diminish
the worth of the eventual outcome, which would be defined as
cheating and a mere reduction of ones efforts.
Sometimes the concerns about cheating and reduced efforts
are also linked to worries about building character. Dresler
et al. (2013) argue that they do not necessarily oppose to
short cuts, but that the more effortful and unenhanced path
can sometimes provide supplementary advantages, such as
increased discipline, dedication, self-knowledge, and feelings of
self-mastery. The avoidance of hardship and difficulties along
the way can thus refrain people from obtaining such virtues and
thereby weaken one’s character (Chatterjee, 2013). Gaucher et al.
(2013) emphasizes that life lessons about the process of learning
and its difficulties are especially important for children, who need
to develop into resilient adults.
The concerns about cheating and depletion of character in
the enhancement debate might be downplayed by the argument
that current neuroenhancers still require effort in order to obtain
successful results (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2012; Levy and Savulescu,
2014). Cohen Kadosh et al. (2012), for example, stress that up
to now, tDCS has shown to be most effective when used in
training paradigms, and similarly Levy and Savulescu (2014)
emphasize that traditional learning processes remain important
for profitable tES-induced enhancements. Thus, the use of tES-
based technologies might not necessarily imply that effort is futile
and hardship is avoided, i.e., easy short cuts are unlikely.
Personal Responsibility and Self-image
The use of cognitive enhancers by children and students also
evokes questions regarding the effects on feelings of personal
responsibility and the child’s self-image (Singh and Kelleher,
2010; Graf et al., 2013). Singh and Kelleher (2010) refer to studies,
which show that children and their parents might attribute their
achievements to the effects of the enhancer, instead of their own
efforts, and that children could justify failures by explaining that
they did not use their enhancing medications. Such a loss of
personal responsibility could lead to psychological dependence
on cognitive enhancers. In addition, some authors warn for the
risk that children who use enhancing substances might consider
themselves abnormal. This could result in a distorted self-image,
especially if the child is also treated differently by people in
his or her environment (Graf et al., 2013). Evidently, such
feelings would be destructive to the psychological wellbeing of
the child. On the other hand, the use of cognitive enhancers
could also boost a child’s self-image. One can easily imagine how
cognitive enhancers could increase self-confidence of children
who experience cognitive struggles. Even if the cognitive effects
would not be observed in more objective experiments, their
placebo effect could still mitigate study-related worries (Flanigan,
2013). In this light, cognitive enhancers thus seem able to
improve psychological wellbeing.
Issues Related to the Societal Context
Autonomy and Coercion
The tension between autonomy and coercion is one of the issues
associated with the societal context of the child. On the one hand,
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there is the autonomy of parent and child, including their right
to freely decide whether they would like to use enhancers. On the
other hand, there is the fear that widespread availability and use
of enhancers creates coercive forces, which could actually confine
their autonomy. With regard to the former, people often refer
to the autonomy principle, which is highly valued in medical
practice (Graf et al., 2013). This principle discloses the right
of an individual to decide freely whether he/she would like to
make use of a certain (risky) treatment or not, and is often
used in the neuroenhancement debate to advocate the permission
of cognitive enhancers for healthy individuals. However, when
the issue regarding the free choice to enhance is shifted toward
the context of a child, a difficult question emanates: to what
extend should children be considered autonomous and thus
capable of making their own decisions? (Singh and Kelleher,
2010; Chatterjee, 2013; Flanigan, 2013; Gaucher et al., 2013; Graf
et al., 2013; Nagel and Graf, 2013; Maslen et al., 2014b).
Although most authors acknowledge that young children
do not possess sufficient decision-making capacity to make
enhancement-related choices, disagreement arises when
specifically focusing on teenagers and adolescents, who are
relatively close to maturity. Some authors refer to studies, which
have shown that adolescents do not yet possess mature decision-
making capabilities (Gaucher et al., 2013; Graf et al., 2013; Nagel
and Graf, 2013), and are prone to impulsive actions or have
a lack of insight regarding long-term implications (Gaucher
et al., 2013). In contrast, other authors mention studies that have
demonstrated adolescents’ capability to understand their medical
condition (Singh and Kelleher, 2010; Chatterjee, 2013) and can
make justifiable medical decisions (Chatterjee, 2013; Flanigan,
2013; Maslen et al., 2014b), which would support the idea that
adolescents should be able to make autonomous decisions. Yet,
the majority of these authors remain cautious, since cognitive
enhancement might induce long-term effects, which may be
difficult for adolescents to fully appraise (Singh and Kelleher,
2010; Chatterjee, 2013; Maslen et al., 2014b). Unremarkably,
this resulted in different opinions regarding the extent to which
the autonomy of the adolescent should be respected by parents,
physicians, and societies. Gaucher et al. (2013) argue that the
decision to use cognitive enhancers should not be made by the
child, but by society that applies the best interest of the child
principle. Singh and Kelleher (2010) do not agree that society
should be deciding, but advocate an approach in which parents’
consent and children’s assent is both required to allow the
use of cognitive enhancers. Flanigan (2013) and Maslen et al.
(2014b) seem more lenient by suggesting that adolescents from
the age of 16 should be considered autonomous (Maslen et al.,
2014b), or even by stating that the autonomy of all teenagers
should be respected, provided that physicians regard the child as
autonomously capable (Flanigan, 2013).
Besides the questions that the availability of cognitive
enhancers elicit regarding the child’s present state of autonomy,
the use of enhancing substances and technologies also provokes
questions regarding the future autonomy of the child and the
right to an open future (Gaucher et al., 2013; Graf et al., 2013;
Nagel and Graf, 2013; Maslen et al., 2014b). This right implies that
children should have “as many open options, opportunities, and
advantages as possible” upon entering their adult lives (Graf et al.,
2013, p. 1254). Improved cognitive performance, induced by
neuroenhancing pharmaceuticals and technologies, might open
new future doors for the child (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2012;
Flanigan, 2013). However, as discussed earlier in the section on
cognitive wellbeing, chances are that the application of tES could
also generate (permanent) cognitive trade-offs that in some way
may limit the child’s future options (Maslen et al., 2014b). This
could result in feelings of comprised autonomy when the child
reaches adulthood, especially if the decision to enhance was made
by parents, instead of the child itself (Maslen et al., 2014b).
Furthermore, Maslen et al. (2014b) argue that if a child suffers
from a clear deficit, the use of tDCS might indeed serve the best
interest of the child, despite the cognitive trade-offs that might
occur. Yet, when clear evidence for cognitive deficits is lacking,
the protection of future autonomy should outweigh the wish for
beneficence (Maslen et al., 2014b).
Besides the issues that revolve around ‘the freedom to
enhance,’ there are also concerns about people’s ‘freedom
not to enhance.’ Fears are expressed that the availability
of neuroenhancers would lead to coercive environments, in
which it would be difficult for individuals to refuse the use
of cognitive enhancers (Singh and Kelleher, 2010; Hamilton
et al., 2011; Chatterjee, 2013; Dresler et al., 2013; Flanigan,
2013; Gaucher et al., 2013; Graf et al., 2013; Lapenta et al.,
2014). One can distinguish two types of coercion: explicit
and implicit (Hamilton et al., 2011; Chatterjee, 2013; Lapenta
et al., 2014). Explicit coercion concerns situations in which an
individual is explicitly requested by their superiors or caregivers
to use a cognitive enhancer for performance improvement
(Chatterjee, 2013). Implicit coercion is more subtle and refers
to a situation in which an individual feels pressured to use
cognitive enhancers in order to satisfy the requirements of a
high standard and often competitive environment (Hamilton
et al., 2011). For instance, expanded availability of cognitive
enhancers could lower acceptance levels of discernable deviations
in cognitive functioning and thereby implicitly give children
the impression that they should push themselves to exceed
their natural potentials (Singh and Kelleher, 2010). This in turn
might indirectly affect their psychological, physical or cognitive
wellbeing. The issue of coercion seems particularly relevant with
regard to children, as they are not yet accredited full legal
autonomy, and could therefore be even more vulnerable to
external forces in ambitious climates (Chatterjee, 2013; Graf et al.,
2013).
In the literature, three main sources were identified that were
particularly relevant for possible coercion of children: parents,
educational environments, and peers. The first one, parents, is
highly applicable to school-aged children who still live with
their families. Several authors expressed their concerns about
parents who might explicitly encourage their children to use
cognitive enhancing substances, be it with the best intentions
for their child (Flanigan, 2013) or out of the desire to develop
exceptionally successful children at all costs (Singh and Kelleher,
2010; Chatterjee, 2013). In some cases, parental wishes to enhance
their children might be pushed by Western conceptions of good
parenting, which require parents to take every measure possible
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to secure the prosperity of their child (Singh and Kelleher,
2010). Besides success-driven motivations for parental pressure,
Singh and Kelleher (2010) also highlight the possibility that
disorganized and less-resourceful households might use cognitive
enhancers as a “child management tool,” which allows parents to
refrain from improving parenting practices and home conditions
(p. 9). The consequent coercive forces from parents toward
their children could translate themselves into psychological and
emotional distress of the child (Singh and Kelleher, 2010).
The second source of pressure that was identified in the
literature was the educational environment, including schools.
Graf et al. (2013) mention that teachers often praise enhancing
stimulants for their valuable effects, and Chatterjee (2013)
suggests that teachers are not hesitant to talk parents into
purchasing pharmaceuticals to improve their child’s performance
in school. Some schools would even denounce parents to
disregard their child’s educational development when ignoring
the advice to use pharmaceutical enhancers (Singh and Kelleher,
2010). Teachers’ motivations to openly and explicitly promote the
use of cognitive enhancing substances could be related to a desire
to help individual children succeed, or teachers might want to
find an easy way to control a class room full of kids (Singh and
Kelleher, 2010). This type of teacher-induced pressure seems to
work mainly via parents.
The final source of pressure is the use of cognitive enhancers
by peers, which could implicitly encourage individuals to take
part in similar behaviors. School-aged children, for instance,
might be susceptible to trends in their environment, including
the use of cognitive enhancers by their peers, and might therefore
decide to start using these substances as well (Graf et al., 2013).
Explicit and implicit social factors could thus hinder children’s
ability to maintain their autonomous stance in their decision to
enhance, and might therefore pose a threat to the child’s present
and future psychosocial wellbeing.
Distributive Justice
Another question that is often raised in the neuroenhancement
debate is: who will have access to new cognitive enhancement
techniques, and who can experience the cognitive benefits? That
is, if these benefits can truly be achieved. It is a question
related to the value of distributive justice, and opinions on this
matter differ. Many envision that the availability of cognitive
enhancers, be it pharmaceuticals or stimulation devices, would
evoke inequalities and widen the gap between the rich and
the poor (Lev, 2010; Hamilton et al., 2011; Dresler et al.,
2013; Gaucher et al., 2013; Graf et al., 2013). Since cognitive
enhancers differ from commonly acknowledged treatments,
health insurance companies will probably refrain from covering
their costs (Hamilton et al., 2011; Chatterjee, 2013; Lapenta
et al., 2014). Therefore, only those people that can afford
neuroenhancers will have access to them and the opportunity
to profit from their potential cognitive benefits. In addition, Lev
(2010) suggested that aﬄuent citizens would be more likely to
know of existing neuroenhancers and would have more time to
obtain them.
Although many authors recognized increased societal
disparities as problematic, some of them also argue that this
would probably not be a decisive issue in the neuroenhancement
debate, as throughout the history access-related inequalities
have widely been accepted on all sorts of levels, including
nutrition, shelter, education and medical care (Hamilton et al.,
2011; Chatterjee, 2013). In addition, Dresler et al. (2013) plead
that natural enhancers, such as sleep and exercise, are just as
likely to generate equality issues. As an example they use a
physically disabled individual that is unable to benefit from the
enhancing merits of exercise. Thus, according to these authors,
the availability of neuroenhancers does not necessarily produce
new justice-related issues, but merely fits into a society that is
already filled with social inequalities.
In contrast to the pessimistic voices that warn for increased
disparities, several authors predict an opposite effect on
distributive justice and explain that the availability of cognitive
enhancers could result in more equality. However, these
arguments seem related to equality of opportunity, and
presume a situation in which equal access to enhancers is
already accomplished. Flanigan (2013), for example claims
that neuroenhancing substances could compensate for already
existing inequalities, such as differences in school quality,
and provide children the opportunity to succeed in difficult
environments. In such a scenario, the author thus assumes that
children in difficult environments have full access to enhancing
technologies. Similarly, Levy and Savulescu (2014) point toward
evidence, which shows that both pharmaceutical enhancers and
tDCS are most effective in people with a low performance base-
line, and claim that this could result in increased equality of
opportunity. The issue of access, which actually precedes the
issues related to equality of opportunity in later life, is not
discussed. Nevertheless, Fitz and Reiner (2014) and Lapenta
et al. (2014) do seem to have targeted their positive expectations
toward equality of access, although mainly with regard to the
availability of tDCS. They claim that tDCS is a relatively cheap
technique compared to the long-term use of pharmaceuticals or
other complex technologies, and is consequently also accessible
for less resourceful people. Yet, it seems that without money, one
is still unable to buy a tDCS device. Therefore, it seems more
appropriate to state that tES-devices are relatively more accessible
compared to pharmaceuticals, although they still require people
to have money. For those who cannot afford the use of tES-based
enhancers, absolute cognitive performance will not be negatively
affected. However, the relative cognitive performance decreases
when other children, who do have the resources to apply tES-
based techniques, enhance themselves. This could result in a
diminished self-concept of cognitive ability or relatively lower
educational achievements, which both constitute to the cognitive
wellbeing of the child.
Boundary between Health and Disease
The distinction between health and disease or enhancement and
treatment was a reoccurring theme in a diverse set of articles,
and evoked questions with regard to the use and availability of
cognitive enhancers. Two main concerns could be distinguished.
First is whether we should use the distinction between health and
disease to judge if a child should be allowed to use enhancers
(Flanigan, 2013; Gaucher et al., 2013; Levy and Savulescu,
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2014; Maslen et al., 2014b). Since tES devices are currently
still unregulated and do not require a doctor’s judgment and
prescription, this question is an important one in considering
potential governance measures. The second concern was related
to a potential shift in the social perception of what constitutes
health and disease. Authors referred to the risk of medicalization
of normal traits (Graf et al., 2013; Levy and Savulescu, 2014),
and although this specific term is obviously linked to the medical
system, it can easily be translated to the case of unregulated tES-
based enhancement devices. Children and their parents might
not search for an official diagnosis to gain access to enhancers,
but the widespread availability and use of tES-devices could
still shift the general image of what is considered to be a
“normal” performance level. One can imagine that a shift in
the boundary between “normal” and “abnormal” might result in
parents and children accepting higher risks to reach a certain
performance level, and thereby disregarding potential threats for
child wellbeing.
UNDERSTANDING THE COMPLEXITY OF
THE ISSUES FOR CHILD WELLBEING
Our literature review shows that the availability and use of tES-
based enhancers might result in a high number of issues for child
wellbeing that together form a complex web of uncertainties and
concerns (Figure 2). However, in order to explore our subsequent
question on “how to deal with the complexity of issues in a
responsible way?” We first need to elaborate on the character of
the issues that we described, and explain what makes them so
complex.
When looking at the issues we have described in the previous
section, we recognize two main factors that contribute to the
complex character of the issues: (1) high levels of factual
uncertainty, and (2) high levels of moral diversity. With regard
to the factor of uncertainty, we observe that many empirical
gaps are still present in the neuroscientific field; no clarity has
been established yet on the long-term (side) effects of tES-based
enhancement or on the technique’s influence on the developing
brain. Moreover, little is known about the exact magnitude
and interpersonal variability of the enhancement effects, and
questions about potential cognitive trade-offs and psychological
and societal effects have still largely remained unanswered. As a
consequence, it is difficult to determine the actual benefits and
risks of the enhancement technique.
The second factor that adds to the complexity of the issues
surrounding tES is the presence of moral diversity. Different
moral views exist on whether a certain enhancement effect
is desirable and whether potential risks are acceptable. These
views depend on one’s personal perspective, i.e., the underlying
structure of beliefs, values and assumptions that frames one’s
opinion (Schön and Rein, 1994; Kupper and De Cock Buning,
2011). When considering the described issue of cheating, for
example, we could argue that the relative weight that one puts
to the end versus the means of a certain task, influences whether
we believe that it is acceptable to use tES for accomplishing
that particular task. Similarly, we could ask ourselves: do I
consider the child’s authenticity to be more important than the
child’s ability to fit into the group, or than the opportunity to
freely decide to use cognitive enhancers? What is the relative
importance that I ascribe to the fair distribution of goods and
services in society? And do I think that certain risks are just as
acceptable for healthy children as they are for children with a
disorder? One’s answer and stance will depend on the values that
one holds dear, and the weight that one attributes to them, which
is likely to be different for each individual.
Besides diversity in moral views due to different weighing
of values, people could also interpret values differently. When
considering the issue of autonomy and coercion, we see that
autonomy could be interpreted as the right to freely decide to
make use of enhancers, or as the right to freely decide not to
make use of enhancers. If one focuses on the first interpretation of
autonomy, then one might not consider the wide availability and
use of tES-devices as problematic. However, when one focuses
on the second interpretation, then the wide availability and
use of tES might all of a sudden be considered a threat, as
it could create coercive environments in which children might
be pressured to apply these techniques against their own will.
Likewise, we encountered different value interpretations with
respect to the authenticity issue that we described. Some seem
to interpret authenticity as the degree to which one remains true
to his or her “natural” characteristics, and therefore condemn the
use of enhancing techniques, while others seem to suggest that
authenticity can actually benefit from a little outside help, as this
can promote authenticity to come to full expression.
Interaction between factual uncertainties and moral diversity
further complicates the issues surrounding tES. Uncertainties
about effects and impact, for instance, can lead to speculation
in the neuroenhancement debate. Chances exist that different
people use arguments that apply to different speculations about
consequences, and thus different enhancement scenarios (e.g.,
“enhancement as the sudden acquisition of skills that one did not
have before” versus “enhancement as a process that still requires
effort and only improves one’s natural capabilities”). This may
influence the stances toward tES-based enhancement and could
make the various arguments difficult to compare.
It is clear that scientific uncertainties and all the different
interpretations and stances obscure the development of clear
and straightforward policy answers. Nevertheless, tES-devices
will further penetrate the market and will become increasingly
available to consumers, including school children and their
parents (Maslen et al., 2014a). Therefore, the challenge for policy-
makers resides in how they will deal with the high levels of
uncertainty and moral diversity that surround the emergence of
tES-based technologies for enhancement in children.
TOWARD AN APPROACH OF
RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION
GOVERNANCE
In the past, the lack of scientific knowledge regarding the
effects of emerging technologies has often been used as an
excuse for regulatory passivity (Martuzzi and Tickner, 2004).
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Only when abundant empirical evidence would indicate that
a specific technology or product could be harmful, policies
would be created to prevent further negative consequences
(Martuzzi and Tickner, 2004). However, the rapid growth of
complex technological innovations has bolstered the realization
that science is not always able to discern a technology’s full
range of (societal) consequences in advance, and that a “wait
and see” policy approach could lead to societal damage and
high public costs. Many therefore stress the importance of
a precautionary attitude toward technologies with uncertain
impacts, and call for early risk intervention in order to avert
irreversible negative consequences (Renn and Klinke, 2015)2.
This review has shown that the availability and education-related
use of tES-based technologies by healthy high school children
are associated with various potential – but uncertain – risks.
In our view, the fact that these risks involve the wellbeing of
children should unquestionably be an extra incentive to apply
a certain level of precaution and anticipatory behavior. Yet,
mere focus on precaution disregards that uncertainty is partly
unavoidable when dealing with new and emerging technologies,
and can even refrain us from discovering more about the actual
risks and benefits that are generated by the use of tES. For this
reason, some researchers suggest to treat new and emerging
technologies as ongoing social experiments, whose acceptability
requires sustained scrutiny (Taebi et al., 2012; van de Poel, 2013).
When focusing on the case of tES-based enhancement in
children, it is evident that scientific uncertainty is not the
only factor that needs to be dealt with. The high level of
moral diversity is a factor just as compelling, and might
even be more crucial for the identification of appropriate
policy responses to this newly emerging technology. This is
illustrated by work of Renn et al. (2011), who promote the
use of a precaution-based governance style when confronted
with scientific uncertainty about impacts, but also state that
when moral diversity – or “ambiguity,” as they phrase it –
is encountered, the participative character of the governance
approach becomes most imperative. They therefore recommend
a discourse-based governance style, based on meaningful
dialogue between all stakeholders and affected publics, when
dealing with issues of both scientific uncertainty and moral
diversity. Their suggestion corresponds to the broader move
toward participation that we have encountered since the 1960s
in the field of science and technology governance, and which,
since then, has been embraced by various scientific traditions,
including Technology Assessment (Schot and Rip, 1996; Palm
and Hansson, 2006), Public Engagement (Rowe and Frewer, 2005;
Delgado et al., 2010), Anticipatory Governance (Guston, 2014),
Risk Governance (Klinke and Renn, 2002; Renn et al., 2011),
and Responsible Research and Innovation (Owen et al., 2012).
These traditions emphasize that participatory practices stimulate
mutual respect between people with different perspectives, and
contribute to the creation of a collective understanding about
the values at stake. And although this does not necessarily
2European Commission (2000) Communication from the Commission on the
precautionary principle (white paper 52000DC0001). Retrieved from: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52000DC0001
assure the provision of straightforward answers, it does have
most potential to contribute to the construction of governance
measures that are more broadly accepted in society (Renn et al.,
2011).
In line with both the call for ongoing scrutiny of new
technologies used in society, and the trend of increased public
and stakeholder participation in the field of science and
technology, we argue for an approach of responsible innovation
governance to deal effectively with the issues concerning tES-
based enhancement by healthy minors. Now, an important
question to touch upon is: what does such an approach entail?
We will briefly elaborate on some aspects that – in our view –
constitute to a framework of responsible research and innovation.
First is inclusive deliberation, which involves the assembling of
and conversational exchange between various stakeholders and
publics who do not usually interact, but nevertheless all have a
stake in the issues at hand (de Jong et al., 2016). The education-
related use of tES-based enhancers by minors is a multifaceted
problem and its mitigation thus requires the integration of
multiple knowledge traditions and perspectives. In other words,
it is not a problem that responsible policy-makers or concerned
neuroscientists alone can solve. The issues that we identified in
this paper are, for example, intricately interwoven with society’s
views on practices of education, child rearing and development,
and the systems in which we envision our children to function
as prospective adults. Solving the problem therefore begins with
making an inventory of which perspectives and actors are to
be involved. This paper already points to a few of them, being
parents, schools, policy-makers, scientists, minors in school,
national and international authorities, tES-producing industries,
and the tES do-it-yourself community.
Second, deliberative practices should encourage both
anticipation and reflection (i.e., sense-making). Based on
current dynamics in research and innovation and our collective
expectations, we can try to envision the future and the way tES
devices might influence it. Evidently, predicting the future is a
futile effort and most certainly not what anticipation is about
(Guston, 2014). Instead, anticipatory activities aim to collectively
explore a range of possible and plausible futures that could help
us to increase resilience, and stimulate public dialogue on how
to act in face of certain developments (Boenink et al., 2010;
Stilgoe et al., 2013). In order to identify which actions should be
taken to guide us to desirable worlds, we should also engage in
reflective processes (Stilgoe et al., 2013; Kupper et al., 2015) that
stimulate thought on current practices, the goals we strive for, the
norms and values we hold dear, and the norms and values that
institutional protocols and cultures communicate outward. For
instance, one could imagine that schools consider both learning
processes and outcomes important, but when only the learning
outcomes are rewarded with grades, children and parents might
get the idea that school only revolves around these, and start to
adapt their behavior toward that end. By performing reflection,
we become more aware of our current role and the ways we can
influence future practices.
Scenario exercises prove to be a useful tool to stimulate
anticipation and reflection in deliberative processes. Both
Boenink et al. (2010) and Lucivero et al. (2011) have described
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methods to systematically develop plausible scenarios. These so-
called “techno-ethical” scenarios provide detailed stories on how
technology and society might co-develop over time, resulting in
various types of futures. The scenarios help actors to imagine
and discuss a broader range of impacts than they might initially
think of, and at the same time prevent them from slipping into
discussions that are merely based on science fiction (Boenink
et al., 2010; Lucivero et al., 2011). We believe that the use
of techno-ethical scenarios will also prove to be valuable in
deliberations on tES-based enhancement. They will not only
stimulate public discussion on the desirability of education-
related enhancement practices of children using tES, but also
provide sufficient contextual information to collaboratively
identify when and where interventions and regulatory measures
might be needed.
Thirdly, deliberation and anticipation by different parties is
only meaningful when it can lead to action. This willingness, but
also the ability to act differently is perhaps the most difficult,
especially because of the presence of so many involved parties
in the inclusive deliberation processes we are outlining here. As
we are dealing with a new phenomenon (i.e., education-related
use of tES-based enhancers), including new parties, it also means
that there are no yet-defined role responsibilities to undertake
certain actions. Therefore, we do not only collaboratively need to
identify appropriate actions, but should also foster stakeholders’
willingness to act. This is an issue of paramount importance
as with new innovations, identified actions usually run counter
to existing institutional borders and forces (Kloet et al., 2012;
Arentshorst et al., 2014). In the field of Responsible Research
and Innovation recent work has started to identify how true
responsiveness of actors can be promoted (de Jong, 2015).
One way to stimulate action and responsive attitudes is to
guide deliberative processes toward the formation of so-called
communities of practice (Wenger, 2000). These are communities
in which various actors (e.g., schools, policy-makers, DIY-
community, scientists, parents, etcetera) with a shared domain of
interest exchange information and experience through sustained
interaction. It encourages mutual learning and the continuous
production and implementation of new and creative solutions.
In the case of tES-based enhancement, a sustained interaction
process should prevent a mere focus on conventional
governmental solutions, such as restrictions on the sale of
tES devices, the compulsory specification of potential risks and
benefits on pre-manufactured devices (Maslen et al., 2014a),
or the funding of extra research into the working-mechanisms
and effects of tES-based enhancement. Although each of
these measures may be valuable to employ, one should also
explore the role responsibilities of other actors, and find ways
to integrate “alternative” action strategies with governmental
measures. In a deliberative process, stakeholders might, for
example, collaboratively identify a role for the Do-It-Yourself
community, in which representatives of this community are
asked to help stimulate a shared responsible mindset amongst
Do-It-Yourselfers (Fitz and Reiner, 2013). Schools may also find
out that they could play a role, for instance by educating parents
and teachers on the ethical dilemmas related to enhancement
practices (Singh and Kelleher, 2010), or by reconsidering the
way good educational performance should be assessed. With
respect to the latter, one could image that a more balanced
focus on both grades and virtues related the act of studying
itself (i.e., the learning process) might mitigate the felt need to
use enhancers. Another form of collaborative action – more
targeted at the research level – is participatory agenda setting.
Through a collective process of inquiry and deliberation,
research priorities can be set that represent multiple interests
and perspectives. These may serve as a “responsible” guiding
structure for future explorations and studies on tES. Evidently,
all the actions described here are merely examples, and we do
not claim that these are the actions that should be undertaken.
Eventually, it should be up to the collaborative efforts of all
relevant stakeholder groups to explore, identify and weigh those
solutions that they regard as most appropriate.
Lastly, we would like to stress that the deliberative search for
solutions has a highly iterative character and requires continuous
accommodation of progressive insights. New research findings
might emerge that either decrease or increase the existing factual
uncertainties surrounding tES, and thereby influence our stances
toward the acceptability and desirability of the enhancement
technique. Moreover, our moral standards are also subject to
change (Swierstra et al., 2009), which implies that the value one
places on, for instance, education is not necessarily stable over
time. To accommodate these changing scientific uncertainties
and morals, we need some degree of flexibility. For this reason,
a one-off policy for tES enhancement seems inappropriate.
Rather, an approach of governance is required that employs
various instruments to target different groups at different levels
(e.g., governmental, institutional, organizational, individual).
This requires the involvement of various actors, each having their
own instruments and sphere of influence. Not only is it crucial to
allow these instruments to be iteratively adjusted over time, but
they should also form a coherent whole to prevent fragmentation
of the problem and to establish an effective overall approach.
The education-related use of tES-based enhancers by healthy
minors is associated with a wide range of issues for child
wellbeing, which are mainly incited by both factual uncertainty
and moral diversity. In order to deal properly with the issues
for child wellbeing, we recommend the use of a governance
framework for responsible innovation. Through sustained
interactions and co-production amongst various actors, this
framework allows us to balances the different moral perspectives
regarding tES use by minors, and to remain adaptive toward
emerging knowledge and dynamic societal values.
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